i would appriciated if the americans stay at home and Nkorean came to attack, but they are at home and Skorean and their boss came to play a war game 7 miles from the border and you say ປະເທດຄອມມິວນິສບ້າອໍານາດ. com...on brother
use your mind before you say anything. BTW i m not Nkorean fan.
i would appriciated if the americans stay at home and Nkorean came to attack, but they are at home and Skorean and their boss came to play a war game 7 miles from the border and you say ປະເທດຄອມມິວນິສບ້າອໍານາດ. com...on brother
use your mind before you say anything. BTW i m not Nkorean fan.
my2cent
You are right! I have so many South Korean friends at my university too, but this time South Korean made mistake, because they had military drill (exercise) at the Western Island without informing North Korean, that is why North Korean shells the that little Island.
No good; No bad; What is good? and What is bad? What/how to measure good/or bad?
We all want peace! Each Korean nation should be treated as an end, not as a means!
Powerholders should have 'Kantian notion duty' to respect all Koreans - not showing or thinking to prefer South or North.
If American get out from Korean sea, things will be good!
Do you really think that if U.S.A. bring all the troop home and both Korean would live side by side ??? You're such innocence. Let' me tell you something bro, as soon as U.S.A. remove the troop, North Korea will invade the South, Read my lip... Unstable Kim Jong iL will destroy the South.
i would appriciated if the americans stay at home and Nkorean came to attack, but they are at home and Skorean and their boss came to play a war game 7 miles from the border and you say ປະເທດຄອມມິວນິສບ້າອໍານາດ. com...on brother
use your mind before you say anything. BTW i m not Nkorean fan.
my2cent
You are right! I have so many South Korean friends at my university too, but this time South Korean made mistake, because they had military drill (exercise) at the Western Island without informing North Korean, that is why North Korean shells the that little Island.
''South Korea made mistake'' What mistake are you talking about ? Because they had miliatry drill with the U.S.A. ? Give me a break !!! South Korea is a Sovereign Nation, She can do anything she want, as long as she does it in her own Water and her Airspace. North Korea was the one that violated the international law by firing the shell into the South Airspace and killed 4 innocent people. a brother is a University student and should've done some research before say something........
I think Laos should stay Neutral as much as possible, Don't take either sides. I knew that our country ''laos'' is the same Communist as North Korea.
As for the war thing, I don't really see North Korea would invade the South. Here my theory: Russia is no longer close allies with the North, they used to sell them and help them with free stuff, But as the North became more radical they abandoned helping them out. as for China, a Chinese would not just jump in and help the North fight the South like they did back in 1950-53 Korean's war. because the Chinese's economy too tied up into the U.S. and would not survive a embargo placed on them which would surely happen if they went to war allied with North Korea. as for the South, they were number one spent money buying American high-Tech war machine and weaponry and upgrade their Army you can say that the North are no matches for the South if they really going to fight each other... as for the North's Newclear weapon, i don't think they do have time to launch their newclear weapons. plus they don't have reliable missile to put a newclear bomb on anyways... Oh shoot, i talk too much already, gotta go...
Neutralism As Washington and Hanoi eyed each other warily, both missed the real developments that compromised Geneva. The story of Laos between 1960 and 1963 is of the struggle to define “neutralism” and give it application. What happened in Vientiane between July 1962 and April 1963 was the denial of the legitimacy of neutralism. And both sides, because of their efforts to evade the Geneva protocol, had forces ready to take advantage.
As a political movement in Laos, neutralism began in 1955, when Quinim Pholsena, a figure from the movement that opposed the Japanese and French and prefigured the Pathet Lao, formed a political party called Peace Through Neutrality (Santhiphap Pen Kang). It was the major non-military, non-communist faction in Laos. His political base was in Sam Neua Province, which became a Pathet Lao hotbed. Pholsena’s Santhiphab, a leftist non-communist movement, nevertheless joined with the Pathet Lao for 1958 elections, because Pholsena had many links to communist leaders.
Neutralism became militarized with the defection of the 2nd Paratroop Battalion of Captain Kong Le in 1960. He overthrew the government that Phoumi Nosavan had empowered after ousting Souvanna Phouma the first time. Souvanna left, accompanied by his CIA case officer, R. Campbell James.
Kong Le reinstalled Souvanna in August 1960, but only a few months later General Phoumi roared back with more troops, recapturing Vientiane. Kong Le retreated to the Plain of Jars. Phoumi then made war on the neutralists, not just the Pathet Lao.
Quinim Pholsena had been minister of information in the Souvanna cabinet and became foreign minister in the rump government Souvanna ran on the Plain of Jars. Pholsena went to Hanoi to ask for help. The Soviet airlift that began in 1960 was originally meant to help the neutralists.
Much as the Americans tried to recruit everyone in sight, the Pathet Lao attempted to propagandize and convert the neutralists. This led to such odd combinations as Kong Le units being “left-wing” or “right-wing” neutralists. The anti-aircraft crews that shot down the Air America plane in November were widely reported to be left-wing neutralists. The Pathet Lao preferred to view Kong Le’s forces as a wholly owned subsidiary, which General Kong Le did not like at all.
Some reports allege that Pholsena was involved in the Pathet Lao schemes. Others believe Pholsena was a left-wing neutralist more by resignation than conviction, and a nationalist fearful of Chinese encroachment. Pholsena may have been capable of conspiracy, but were these conspiracies he wanted?
He began supporting Colonel Deuane Sounnalath, Kong Le’s artillery commander and another left-wing neutralist, whose crews had destroyed the C-123. Souvanna meanwhile threw his backing to Colonel Ketsana Vongsouvan, Kong Le’s chief of staff and longtime friend. On February 12, 1963, in an act very unusual in Laotian politics, assassins murdered Ketsana. On that very day Souvanna and Pholsena left Laos with the king to tour all the countries that had signed the Geneva Protocol.
General Kong Le responded by moving to suppress Deuane. The five people he ordered arrested in the wake of the Ketsana murder were all Deuane soldiers. According to Hugh Toye, a close observer of the Lao scene at the time, the real murderer sought refuge with the Pathet Lao.
Before long, Kong Le privately asked the Americans to expand his aid to include arms and ammunition. Kong Le’s moves caused a split within the neutralist armed forces. Deuane openly joined the Pathet Lao. Colonel Khamouane Boupha, with 1,500 or more men in far northern Laos, joined Deuane. Together they formed the “Patriotic Neutralists,” accusing Kong Le of “deviationism.” With only about 5,500 troops, this split seriously weakened neutralist power. The bulk of Kong Le loyalists were in the Plain of Jars.
During this interval, General Kong Le had contacts with Ambassador Unger and Phoumi Nosavan. He told Unger that Souvanna and the king had received assurances that Beijing and Hanoi would stop interfering in Laotian internal affairs. Kong Le told Phoumi—and the general repeated to Unger—that he had “liquidated” Deuane and had the Plain of Jars well in hand. When an ICC delegation visited the Plain, Kong Le told them that Phoumi must realize that if he went under there would be no barrier between the Phoumist forces and the communists. He also reported that Hanoi’s troop strength near the Plain—the most important war zone in northern Laos—stood at two battalions. On March 29 Deuane and Kong Le troops began shooting at each other after a fight broke out at the marketplace in Xieng Khouangville.
That morning in Vientiane, before the first reports of fighting, Unger met his Western counterparts to discuss giving weapons to Kong Le. The American appealed to the French for the use of their weapons stockpiled at Seno in the Laotian panhandle. Using these would avoid a Geneva violation. The weapons were old and scheduled for shipment home, but the French ambassador agreed to consider the proposal.
I
The Pholsena assassination triggered the final breakdown of the Geneva Protocol. Some saw it as a right-wing plot, but the context of the power struggle among neutralist forces seems quite clear. Pathet Lao ministers fled from Vientiane. Fighting flared on the Plain of Jars. In Washington, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research predicted: “Quinim’s assassination is unlikely to lead to an immediate change in Pathet Lao tactics” because anything like an all-out offensive on the Plain of Jars “would presumably require advance consultation with Moscow, [Beijing], and Hanoi.” But, in fact, the Pathet Lao intervened in force alongside the left-wing neutralists on April 6. Colonel Deuane took refuge with them at Khang Khay. Augmented by Pathet Lao forces, his troops forced Kong Le back until he was holding on to just a few defense positions.
The best way to view these actions is as Vang Pao’s bid to escape the straightjacket imposed by Geneva. Instead of small and infrequent consignments of “hard rice,” Vang Pao could transform his situation with Washington through an overt military response along lines he knew corresponded to American policy preferences. Then the CIA would be obliged to back the armée clandestine to the extent of its capability. The tragic aspect of the Hmong operation is that Vang Pao, in effect, dragged the United States in behind him, eliminating whatever chance there might have been to preserve the integrity of neutralist government in Laos.
Vang Pao’s scheme worked well. On April 10 there was a meeting of the National Security Council at the White House. The State Department planning paper listed continued supply efforts to Kong Le and the Hmong as the lead recommendation, with inserting Phoumi forces into the neutralist army disguised as “volunteers” immediately behind, and approving Vang Pao’s “tactical redeployment” as the third.
Averell Harriman supported the supply recommendation and JFK approved. In a dispatch on April 19, undersecretary of state George Ball warned that any effort by Kong Le with Vang Pao’s help to recapture the whole Plain of Jars would destroy anything left of the Geneva cease fire, but the CIA’s Whitehouse countered the next day that Kong Le was in extremis and his position would be lost “if not for flexibility now authorized to Meos.”
On April 20 the National Security Council approved initiatives to secure support for Vientiane from London and Paris, along with an approach to the Russians, the dispatch of a carrier task force to the South China Sea, and preparation of plans for coercive actions against North Vietnam. There was further talk of supplies to Kong Le and Vang Pao at the NSC on April 22.
Shortly after noon on April 21, President Kennedy telephoned Harriman. “Am I talking to the architect of the Geneva Accords?” Kennedy asked. “I have been willing to say that,” Harriman answered, “And if it goes down, to take the blame for it.” Jack Kennedy replied: “I have a piece of it, [too].”
War in Laos had resumed and would continue throughout the Indochina conflict.
Available records contain no evidence indicating that Hanoi exercised direct control over the Pathet Lao and none that the Pathet Lao deliberately tried to destroy the cease fire. Records also do not show that Washington purposefully attempted to return to a state of war. On the other hand, there is plentiful evidence that both sides assumed that their adversaries had no interest in abiding by the protocol and therefore took actions at the margin, subverting it as a hedge to counter the enemy.
The sides created a superheated situation in which the fight for domination among Laotian neutralists ignited a spark. North Vietnamese and American clients—in this case the CIA secret army of Vang Pao—could pull their sponsors into war. The first casualty became the neutralist government in Laos. As for the Geneva protocol, the sides chose to pretend that it worked just fine. Laos became a secret war.
You are right! I have so many South Korean friends at my university too, but this time South Korean made mistake, because they had military drill (exercise) at the Western Island without informing North Korean, that is why North Korean shells the that little Island.
''South Korea made mistake'' What mistake are you talking about ? Because they had miliatry drill with the U.S.A. ? Give me a break !!! South Korea is a Sovereign Nation, She can do anything she want, as long as she does it in her own Water and her Airspace. North Korea was the one that violated the international law by firing the shell into the South Airspace and killed 4 innocent people. a brother is a University student and should've done some research before say something........
I am not pro N-Korean and I am not socialism (communism)mind that much, but maybe you need to read more (other media sources) not only what S-Korean and American said OK.
N-Korea will not fire on the Island if SKorea didn't do anything first. There is causal before the effect...
So, I advise you to READ MORE! What S-Korean did before N-Korean started the fire.
You are right! I have so many South Korean friends at my university too, but this time South Korean made mistake, because they had military drill (exercise) at the Western Island without informing North Korean, that is why North Korean shells the that little Island.
You are right! I have so many South Korean friends at my university too, but this time South Korean made mistake, because they had military drill (exercise) at the Western Island without informing North Korean, that is why North Korean shells the that little Island.
I THINK THE LAO GOVERNMENT , THEY DON'T SUPPORT THE WAR, BUT THEY SUPPORT ECONOMICS AND MONEY WITH PEACE , IN THIS CASE WE SHOULD LOVE EACH OTHER IN 3 ETHNIC GROUP IN LAOS. WE DON'T DIVIDE OR SEPARATE : HMONG, LAOTIAN, KHAMU( LAO THENG) "THIS YOU CAN SEE IN PEACE" .
WE BE SURE THAT ONE DAY, WE HAVE MANY POPULATION IN THE WORLD WE WILL BE NOTICED THE WAR , DON'T YOU?
AND ABOUT YOUR OPINION ? MAKE WAR IS NOT SIMPLE IN LIFE AND POVERTY ONLY LOSE, AND GET DEATH.
WE DON'T BE ANY SIDE , WE LIVE A LONE PARTY IN PEACE .
''South Korea made mistake'' What mistake are you talking about ? Because they had miliatry drill with the U.S.A. ? Give me a break !!! South Korea is a Sovereign Nation, She can do anything she want, as long as she does it in her own Water and her Airspace. North Korea was the one that violated the international law by firing the shell into the South Airspace and killed 4 innocent people. a brother is a University student and should've done some research before say something........
I am not pro N-Korean and I am not socialism (communism)mind that much, but maybe you need to read more (other media sources) not only what S-Korean and American said OK.
N-Korea will not fire on the Island if SKorea didn't do anything first. There is causal before the effect...
So, I advise you to READ MORE! What S-Korean did before N-Korean started the fire.
Brother oh brother, you seem to side with the wrong guy here. Don't you see the way Dear Leader King Jong iL is running his country ??? beside bullied his neighbor South Korea he also blackmail Bill Clinton for 8 years and International Aids and he's doing it ever sine he's in power in mid 90... Oh by the way, My major was politcal science and i know what i'm talking about.
Neutralism As Washington and Hanoi eyed each other warily, both missed the real developments that compromised Geneva. The story of Laos between 1960 and 1963 is of the struggle to define “neutralism” and give it application. What happened in Vientiane between July 1962 and April 1963 was the denial of the legitimacy of neutralism. And both sides, because of their efforts to evade the Geneva protocol, had forces ready to take advantage.
As a political movement in Laos, neutralism began in 1955, when Quinim Pholsena, a figure from the movement that opposed the Japanese and French and prefigured the Pathet Lao, formed a political party called Peace Through Neutrality (Santhiphap Pen Kang). It was the major non-military, non-communist faction in Laos. His political base was in Sam Neua Province, which became a Pathet Lao hotbed. Pholsena’s Santhiphab, a leftist non-communist movement, nevertheless joined with the Pathet Lao for 1958 elections, because Pholsena had many links to communist leaders.
Neutralism became militarized with the defection of the 2nd Paratroop Battalion of Captain Kong Le in 1960. He overthrew the government that Phoumi Nosavan had empowered after ousting Souvanna Phouma the first time. Souvanna left, accompanied by his CIA case officer, R. Campbell James.
Kong Le reinstalled Souvanna in August 1960, but only a few months later General Phoumi roared back with more troops, recapturing Vientiane. Kong Le retreated to the Plain of Jars. Phoumi then made war on the neutralists, not just the Pathet Lao.
Quinim Pholsena had been minister of information in the Souvanna cabinet and became foreign minister in the rump government Souvanna ran on the Plain of Jars. Pholsena went to Hanoi to ask for help. The Soviet airlift that began in 1960 was originally meant to help the neutralists.
Much as the Americans tried to recruit everyone in sight, the Pathet Lao attempted to propagandize and convert the neutralists. This led to such odd combinations as Kong Le units being “left-wing” or “right-wing” neutralists. The anti-aircraft crews that shot down the Air America plane in November were widely reported to be left-wing neutralists. The Pathet Lao preferred to view Kong Le’s forces as a wholly owned subsidiary, which General Kong Le did not like at all.
Some reports allege that Pholsena was involved in the Pathet Lao schemes. Others believe Pholsena was a left-wing neutralist more by resignation than conviction, and a nationalist fearful of Chinese encroachment. Pholsena may have been capable of conspiracy, but were these conspiracies he wanted?
He began supporting Colonel Deuane Sounnalath, Kong Le’s artillery commander and another left-wing neutralist, whose crews had destroyed the C-123. Souvanna meanwhile threw his backing to Colonel Ketsana Vongsouvan, Kong Le’s chief of staff and longtime friend. On February 12, 1963, in an act very unusual in Laotian politics, assassins murdered Ketsana. On that very day Souvanna and Pholsena left Laos with the king to tour all the countries that had signed the Geneva Protocol.
General Kong Le responded by moving to suppress Deuane. The five people he ordered arrested in the wake of the Ketsana murder were all Deuane soldiers. According to Hugh Toye, a close observer of the Lao scene at the time, the real murderer sought refuge with the Pathet Lao.
Before long, Kong Le privately asked the Americans to expand his aid to include arms and ammunition. Kong Le’s moves caused a split within the neutralist armed forces. Deuane openly joined the Pathet Lao. Colonel Khamouane Boupha, with 1,500 or more men in far northern Laos, joined Deuane. Together they formed the “Patriotic Neutralists,” accusing Kong Le of “deviationism.” With only about 5,500 troops, this split seriously weakened neutralist power. The bulk of Kong Le loyalists were in the Plain of Jars.
During this interval, General Kong Le had contacts with Ambassador Unger and Phoumi Nosavan. He told Unger that Souvanna and the king had received assurances that Beijing and Hanoi would stop interfering in Laotian internal affairs. Kong Le told Phoumi—and the general repeated to Unger—that he had “liquidated” Deuane and had the Plain of Jars well in hand. When an ICC delegation visited the Plain, Kong Le told them that Phoumi must realize that if he went under there would be no barrier between the Phoumist forces and the communists. He also reported that Hanoi’s troop strength near the Plain—the most important war zone in northern Laos—stood at two battalions. On March 29 Deuane and Kong Le troops began shooting at each other after a fight broke out at the marketplace in Xieng Khouangville.
That morning in Vientiane, before the first reports of fighting, Unger met his Western counterparts to discuss giving weapons to Kong Le. The American appealed to the French for the use of their weapons stockpiled at Seno in the Laotian panhandle. Using these would avoid a Geneva violation. The weapons were old and scheduled for shipment home, but the French ambassador agreed to consider the proposal.
I
The Pholsena assassination triggered the final breakdown of the Geneva Protocol. Some saw it as a right-wing plot, but the context of the power struggle among neutralist forces seems quite clear. Pathet Lao ministers fled from Vientiane. Fighting flared on the Plain of Jars. In Washington, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research predicted: “Quinim’s assassination is unlikely to lead to an immediate change in Pathet Lao tactics” because anything like an all-out offensive on the Plain of Jars “would presumably require advance consultation with Moscow, [Beijing], and Hanoi.” But, in fact, the Pathet Lao intervened in force alongside the left-wing neutralists on April 6. Colonel Deuane took refuge with them at Khang Khay. Augmented by Pathet Lao forces, his troops forced Kong Le back until he was holding on to just a few defense positions.
The best way to view these actions is as Vang Pao’s bid to escape the straightjacket imposed by Geneva. Instead of small and infrequent consignments of “hard rice,” Vang Pao could transform his situation with Washington through an overt military response along lines he knew corresponded to American policy preferences. Then the CIA would be obliged to back the armée clandestine to the extent of its capability. The tragic aspect of the Hmong operation is that Vang Pao, in effect, dragged the United States in behind him, eliminating whatever chance there might have been to preserve the integrity of neutralist government in Laos.
Vang Pao’s scheme worked well. On April 10 there was a meeting of the National Security Council at the White House. The State Department planning paper listed continued supply efforts to Kong Le and the Hmong as the lead recommendation, with inserting Phoumi forces into the neutralist army disguised as “volunteers” immediately behind, and approving Vang Pao’s “tactical redeployment” as the third.
Averell Harriman supported the supply recommendation and JFK approved. In a dispatch on April 19, undersecretary of state George Ball warned that any effort by Kong Le with Vang Pao’s help to recapture the whole Plain of Jars would destroy anything left of the Geneva cease fire, but the CIA’s Whitehouse countered the next day that Kong Le was in extremis and his position would be lost “if not for flexibility now authorized to Meos.”
On April 20 the National Security Council approved initiatives to secure support for Vientiane from London and Paris, along with an approach to the Russians, the dispatch of a carrier task force to the South China Sea, and preparation of plans for coercive actions against North Vietnam. There was further talk of supplies to Kong Le and Vang Pao at the NSC on April 22.
Shortly after noon on April 21, President Kennedy telephoned Harriman. “Am I talking to the architect of the Geneva Accords?” Kennedy asked. “I have been willing to say that,” Harriman answered, “And if it goes down, to take the blame for it.” Jack Kennedy replied: “I have a piece of it, [too].”
War in Laos had resumed and would continue throughout the Indochina conflict.
Available records contain no evidence indicating that Hanoi exercised direct control over the Pathet Lao and none that the Pathet Lao deliberately tried to destroy the cease fire. Records also do not show that Washington purposefully attempted to return to a state of war. On the other hand, there is plentiful evidence that both sides assumed that their adversaries had no interest in abiding by the protocol and therefore took actions at the margin, subverting it as a hedge to counter the enemy.
The sides created a superheated situation in which the fight for domination among Laotian neutralists ignited a spark. North Vietnamese and American clients—in this case the CIA secret army of Vang Pao—could pull their sponsors into war. The first casualty became the neutralist government in Laos. As for the Geneva protocol, the sides chose to pretend that it worked just fine. Laos became a secret war.
OMG, After read 3-4 times back and forth just to make sure what the article were saying. if a readers do not pay attention to what he/she was reading, there's no way people will understand. So here my Summary about the Articles:
The single most important reality of the (TroiKa= treaty) coalition period was that the Three Separate Factions continued to control the administration and military security of their own Areas.( Three separate factions mean= Lelftist, Rightist, and Neutrolist political parties) these area were not fixed. There were no front lines. Patrols of Phoumist soldiers offen brushed with Pathet Lao patrols, and this brushed meant continued skimishing in the countryside. A village in Pathet Lao hands one week might well be occupied the following week by Phoumist troops, whose stay was bound to be just as brief. The de-facto partition of the Kingdom gave rise to seemingly insulable differences. There was, for istance, the matter of authorizing armed guards from each faction to enter Vientiane to ensure the security of their political leaders... see the reason now bro. in my personal opinion, it's been done sine early 1700, that's why our Anachack LanXang has had collapses and became prey for Surrounding neighbors..........
Sabaidee, if you've been in N. Korean before just think about people overthere how they can live. For example, mobile phone pleople overthere cannot use at all, believe or not just go overthere and you will know how the goverment treat the people. The government have to enforcement to believe the leader as the god, respect, and worship to them.
Different from Laos, Lao people is freedom to use cellphone, to go oversea, or ....we know that the political is the same but we do not respect the leader as the god, bez we have the religious to believe if we believe in god as the leader then we will stupid as the leader.
People have a right to show out what they need, what they want, and what they like, if you compare to N.korean people they cant talk anything even on the phone they also can not why? people in this world know what happen?
Before, Laos have the King so king believe as a god, if you say something not good then they will kill according to the king law.
Thailand also believe King as a god if you say something not good they will arrest you to the jail.
King, Leader, and People who is the first to respect?
I'M IN THE OFFICER OF GOVERNMENT IN MY OPINIONS.